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Abstract: One of the most important debates in Irish economic history has concerned the long-run
effects of the Great Irish Famine, with some arguing that it had only temporary effects on the
economy and others seeing it as a major demographic and economic watershed. This paper adapts
the theoretical framework of Krugman (1991) to illustrate how the combination of the Famine and
developments in transportation and the demand for industrial products may have worked together
to cause persistent depopulation and relative industrial decline.
I  INTRODUCTION
he long-run effects of the Great Irish Famine is an issue that has T received much prominence from economic historians. Beyond the
discussions in detailed historical studies such as Ó Gráda (1994), the subject
has been brought to the attention of a wider audience within the economics
profession with the publication of articles on the topic by Guinnane (1994) and
O’Rourke (1994) in the American Economic Review. That the Famine directly
caused a large decline in the Irish population is indisputable. However, what is
more controversial is the role it played in the two key elements of post-Famine
Irish economic history: the pattern of continuing depopulation that lasted until
1951 and the failure to develop substantial industrial employment despite2 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
economic integration with what was then the world’s leading economic power.
While some have seen the Famine as a major watershed in Irish economic and
demographic history, others have represented it as having only temporary
importance and focused on other factors to explain post-Famine developments.
A number of themes have emerged in the debate over the role the Famine
may have played in shaping subsequent economic development. The first is
whether the Famine had an important influence on the post-Famine pattern of
rural depopulation. Peter Solar (1989) and, more formally, Kevin O’Rourke
(1991a, 1991b) have argued that, contrary to “revisionist” claims that post-
Famine rural depopulation was simply due to exogenous price changes that led
to a move away from labour-intensive tillage and potatoes towards pasture, the
decline in rural population was due to the effect of potato blight in reducing
yields and the pull of higher wages in industry abroad. However, explaining
rural depopulation cannot be the full story concerning the decline in Irish
population. To quote O’Rourke:
Given that labour left Irish agriculture to work in industry, why did it end
up in industry located abroad rather than in Ireland? Until this question
is satisfactorily resolved, explanations for long-run Irish rural depopulation
cannot be regarded as explanations for Irish depopulation per se.
Thus, whether the Famine and its associated emigration had an important
retarding effect on industrial development has been a second important theme.
There are at least two identifiable theories of how the depopulation associated
with the Famine may have affected Irish industry in a negative fashion. The
first focuses on the potential effects of a “brain drain” in which the best and
brightest workers emigrated. O’Rourke (1992) has provided a formal model along
these lines. An alternative approach sees the decline in the size of the “home
market” for industrial goods as an important causal factor. This concern can be
found, for instance, in Cullen (1972). More recently, Cormac Ó Gráda (1994) has
suggested that Paul Krugman’s (1991) illustration of how “home market” effects
resulting from firm-level economies of scale can lead to economies dividing up
into manufacturing “cores” and agricultural peripheries may be relevant for
understanding nineteenth-century Irish economic history.1 This paper further
explores the implications of Krugman’s approach by extending it along two simple
lines. First, while Krugman’s model examines the forces likely to generate
regional economic convergence or divergence, it is static in nature; here, we
extend the model to allow for simple dynamics. Second, and more importantly,
while Krugman’s model contains an agricultural sector with a fixed number of
agricultural workers, we allow for rural depopulation.
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These extensions to the basic Krugman model provide some useful insights
into how the depopulation resulting from the Famine may have affected
industrial development. First, the Krugman model does not unambiguously fore-
cast regional economic divergence but rather shows that whether the economy
ends up at a convergent or divergent equilibrium depends on exogenous variables
such as the level of transportation costs. The simulations in this paper show
that, even if the model’s parameters are inconsistent with long-run economic
divergence, the population decline that resulted from the Famine would have
implied a substantial reduction in Irish industrial employment during the second
half of the nineteenth century. Second, available evidence suggests that other
economic developments of this period, such as improved transportation networks
and a growing demand for industrial products, tended to strengthen the forces
encouraging a divergent outcome and thus may have reinforced the effects of
the Famine to create a pattern of persistent depopulation and relative industrial
decline.
The contents of this paper are as follows: Section II discusses some of the
basic facts of the post-Famine Irish economy and outlines some of the important
debates in more detail. Section III describes Krugman’s model of economic
geography and summarises its principal results. Section IV extends this basic
model to allow for rural depopulation and some simple dynamics. We show how
these extensions deliver a model consistent with many aspects of nineteenth
century Irish economic history. Section V concludes.
II  THE POST-FAMINE ECONOMY: FACTS AND DEBATES
The Great Irish Famine of 1845-50 was the most momentous event of
nineteenth century Irish history. The Famine, triggered by repeated failures of
the potato crop due to the mysterious fungus phythophthora infestans, led to
the death of an estimated one million of the 8.5 million Irish population of 1845.
With emigration during this period reinforcing the depopulation, by 1851 the
Irish population had declined 20 per cent from its 1845 level, standing at
6.5 million.2 Measured in proportionate terms, the Famine was probably one of
the world’s deadliest of the last two centuries.
Significant as the population decline brought about by the Famine was, it
would not have had much effect on Irish population in the long run if normal
rates of population growth had set in during the post-Famine period. Watkins
and Menken (1985) have shown that the resumption of “normal” patterns of
population growth would have implied that 50 years later, the Famine’s effects
2. Sources: Guinnane (1994), O’Rourke (1991b), and Ó Gráda (1989).4 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
would have been barely noticeable. Ireland’s post-Famine demographic
experience, however, was anything but normal. The period saw a pattern of
persistent population decline unlike that seen in any other European country.
Population declined a further 21 per cent between 1851 and 1881, reaching
5.175 million; by 1901 it stood at 4.6 million.3 Despite the heavy concentration
of historians and demographers upon post-Famine patterns of marriage and
fertility, emigration was by far the principal cause of this decline. Surveying
evidence on post-Famine demographics, Guinnane (1997) indicates that the Irish
birth rate during this period was unremarkable by European standards. While
this unremarkable birthrate was achieved with the unusual combination of large
families but low marriage rates, this still cannot take away from the primacy of
emigration as the cause of depopulation. The total number of emigrants from
Ireland between 1850 and 1910 was 4.2 million. The US and Britain were by far
the most common destinations, with US emigration outnumbering British by a
factor of roughly 2 to 1.
What was the driving force behind post-Famine emigration? Most historians
have focused directly upon the decline in rural population. The Famine
obliterated 200,000 smallholdings and the number of agricultural workers
declined from 1.84 million in 1841 to 0.78 million in 1911.4 Recent years have
seen some important research on the role the Famine played in this decline.
Certain “revisionist” historians such as Crotty (1966) had suggested that the
post-Famine decline in agricultural development had nothing to do with the
Famine but was rather the result of essentially exogenous price shocks in
commodity markets that moved Irish agriculture away from labour-intensive
tillage and potatoes and towards pasture. O’Rourke (1991a), however, has
constructed a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Irish agriculture
of this period and concluded that such price shocks cannot have reduced
agricultural employment. He proposes a simpler theory, linked directly to the
Famine, of how labour demand factors could have reduced post-Famine agri-
cultural employment. The blight that led to the Famine permanently reduced
potato yields. The CGE simulations confirm that, through this mechanism, the
Famine led to substantially reduced demand for agricultural labour.
Of course, to focus on the “push” factor of rural depopulation is to look at only
one-half of the equation driving Irish emigration. Indeed, concentration on the
decline in agricultural employment may tend to paint a picture of an economy
in crisis with declining living standards. In fact, this is not the case. Living
standards of both agricultural and industrial workers in Ireland rose during
this period. However, they did so at a slower rate than was occurring in the
3. Source: Ó Gráda (1989).
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United States or Britain. Guinnane (1994) thus argues that it was the “pull”
factor of external (and, by implication, exogenous) economic change which drove
emigration:
Growing demand for labour in Britain and North America meant that Irish
workers would have to be paid more at home or seek their fortunes
elsewhere … Ireland’s population did fall after the famine. In the absence
of industrialization — the paucity of which is another great question in
Irish economic history — one could hardly have expected anything else.
Here Guinnane echoes the point made by O’Rourke, quoted in the introduction,
but views the failure of industrialisation as a separate issue, unconnected with
the Famine or rural depopulation.
Ultimately, then, a full explanation of Irish depopulation must incorporate
an explanation of why Irish industry did not expand to absorb the rural exodus
and why Irish industrial wages were insufficient to keep millions of non-
agricultural workers in Ireland. While there is evidence that Ireland’s industrial
decline pre-dated the Famine, as the expansion of transportation networks and
the onset of the factory system caused cottage industries to become uncom-
petitive, the relative decline during the post-Famine period is stark. Bielenberg
(1991) shows that during the period 1840-1910 the growth in Irish industrial
output was very slight and compared very poorly with the four-fold increase in
UK output. Despite the large number of potential suspects (limited resource
endowments, perceived riskiness of investing in Irish capital, poor industrial
financing) there have been few convincing explanations of the relative failure of
Irish industry to develop despite its economic integration with the world’s
industrial leader, Britain. Generally, explanations have centred around the
elusive concept of technological externalities: those regions that industrialise
first obtain a productivity advantage over other regions, which thereby reinforces
their advantage and leads to economic divergence.5
More recently, O’Rourke (1992) has provided a formal analysis of one of the
more common “structural” explanations of Irish industrial decline: that this
decline was a result of the loss of skilled workers due to emigration.6 He presents
a simple two country model with mobile capital and labour. It is assumed that
there are two types of labour, shirkers and non-shirkers, with shirkers having
the lower productivity and only non-shirkers being able to move between regions.
This productivity difference, however, cannot be detected by firm managers and
so each individual receives the average productivity of workers in their firm.
O’Rourke shows that, within this framework, there is potential for convergence
5. See, for instance, O’Malley (1981).
6. See pp. 229-230 of Ó Gráda (1994) for a discussion of this issue.6 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
towards an equilibrium in which all skilled labour ends up in one of the regions.
The convergence process consists of a period during which there is emigration
of skilled labour from one region (Ireland) to the other (Britain) because the
already higher ratio of skilled to unskilled implies higher wages.
While this model does fit some of the important facts of the period, it seems
unlikely that it can provide a particularly complete explanation of post-Famine
Irish economic developments. Its crucial assumptions, that only the higher-
skilled workers emigrated and that managers could not distinguish between
high and low skill workers, do not have much empirical evidence to back them
up. The second assumption seems particularly untenable since, given the
assumption that only non-shirkers move between regions, workers had some
characteristics that would have allowed firms to diagnose their skill level.
According to the model, all Irish workers in Britain and all British workers in
Ireland were high skill. If one adds the ability of firms to distinguish whether
an individual is Irish or British (usually not a very difficult task), the model
would generate the strange result that all skilled workers in both countries
could obtain a wage consistent with their level of productivity by emigrating to
the other country while those who remained in their own country could be
diagnosed as shirkers and get paid a lower wage. The model also contains only
one sector and so is unable to describe the interactions between rural
depopulation and industrial development. We now describe a model that we
will adapt for this purpose.
III  KRUGMAN’S MODEL OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Krugman’s (1991) model describes how firm-level increasing returns,
transportation costs, and free mobility of labour can combine to produce an
outcome in which two initially similar regions can become divided up into a
manufacturing “core” and an agricultural “periphery”. Since, at a very basic
level, this story fits the pattern of economic development in Ireland and Britain
during the nineteenth century, we may be interested in seeing whether or not
the rural depopulation triggered by the Famine can play a role in accounting
for post-Famine economic developments. Thus, in the next section, we outline a
couple of extensions to Krugman’s model which allow us to examine this issue.
In this section, we present a brief summary of the model.
3.1 Krugman’s Model: Setup
The model contains many of the analytical tools that Krugman has employed
in a series of seminal articles on international trade. It makes many very specific
assumptions concerning the structure of preferences, factor distributions, and
technology. However, as Dixit (1993) has stressed, most of the qualitativeECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 7
implications derived with these functional form assumptions have proved robust
to changes in functional forms.
Factor Allocations: There are two regions, each containing peasants, who work
in a homogenous agricultural sector, and workers, who work in differentiated
manufacturing industries. There are a total of N such industries in the combined
two-region economy. Trade between regions is subject to transportation costs of
the “iceberg” form: when x goods are sent for consumption outside the region in
which they were produced, only tx arrive. The total number of peasants plus
workers in both regions is normalised to 1 with     peasants in each region.
There are a total of m workers distributed between the two regions: L1 + L2 = m.
Preferences: Consumers have utility function
   U = CM
m CA
1-m (1)
where CA is consumption of agricultural goods and CM is consumption of a

















These preferences dictate that consumers will spend a proportion m of their
incomes on the manufactured goods and the rest on agricultural goods.7 Given
prices pA, which we will normalise to one, and pi for each manufacturing good,































and l is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
7. Krugman chose m as both the proportion of income spent on manufactures and the proportion
of manufacturing workers in the joint two-region economy to give the same wage in industry and
agriculture. This assumption could be altered without changing the results.
1-m
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Technology, Pricing and Output: Producers of each of the manufacturing goods
use a labour-only production function with a simple form of increasing returns
to scale, defined using a labour-requirement function:
  
LMi =a+b xi (5)
where xi is production of manufactured good i. The number of manufactured
goods, N, is assumed to be large and so each individual firm takes q as given.












































Since firms are symmetric this defines the level of output for all firms in both
regions. Letting ni be the total number of manufacturing products in region i we












Thus the number of manufactured goods produced in each region is proportional
to the number of industrial workers.
Nominal and Real Wages: The zero profit condition and the fact that wages are
the only input means that total wage expenditures in region i, wiLi, equals total
expenditures on goods from region i. Defining z11 as the ratio of region 1


































(10)ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 9










































































+ wiLi    i = 1,2 (14)















































m  is the proportion of manufacturing firms in region 1. Given these
price indices the real wages are
   w1 = w1P1
-m   w2 = w2P2
-m (17)
3.2  Convergence or Divergence?
While Krugman’s paper has no explicit dynamics, it does pose the question:
Will the movement of manufacturing workers from one region to another tend
to increase the relative wage in the region that receives the workers? If so, this
will tend to reinforce the original pattern of labour mobility. Ultimately, this10 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
process will lead a divergent outcome in which all industry is located in one
region with the other region being solely agricultural. In terms of the model’s





? The answer turns out to be “it depends”. The model contains
forces that work in both possible directions.
There are two forces tending to encourage divergence:
• The “home market” effect: If production costs were identical in both regions,
then economies of scale would dictate that it would always be more
profitable to produce in the large market, thereby minimising trans-
portation costs. The zero-profit assumption must then imply higher wages
in the bigger economy. The larger the difference between big and small
economies, the stronger this effect will be.
• Price effects: Workers choosing to live in the larger economy will obtain
more goods at pre-transportation-cost prices and so will have higher real
wages.
Acting to encourage convergence is the fact that when firms re-locate to the
other market, those firms that remain have a higher demand for their products
because the re-located firms are now selling their products at the higher post-
transportation-cost price. The zero profit condition then implies a higher wage.
Dictating whether the convergent or divergent forces are the stronger are
the share of expenditure on manufactures, m, the transportation cost measure,
t, and the elasticity of substitution, s. We will not be interested in s but the
effects of changes in m and t are as follows:
• t: The higher are transportation costs the stronger is the force for
convergence: When workers move to another region, higher transportation
costs imply a more significant shift in expenditure patterns towards
products still produced locally. To illustrate this effect, Figure 1 reproduces









 for t = 0.5 and t = 0.75. The other parameters are m = 0.3,
s = 4. For t = 0.5 transportation costs are high and increasing concentration
of labour leads to a higher relative wage in the smaller economy. This
pattern is reversed for t = 0.75.
• m: An increase in the budget share of manufactured goods strengthens the
forces for divergence since it implies a higher proportion of income is spent





f and shows how, for t = 0.5, s = 4, increasing m from 0.3 to 0.5 moves the
model away from convergence and towards divergence.ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 11
Figure 1: Effect of f on Relative Wages
Figure 2: Effect of f on Relative Wages12 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
IV  SIMULATING POST-FAMINE IRELAND
We now show how Krugman’s model can be adapted to shed light on the
dynamics of post-Famine Ireland. The starting point for our simulation is a
very rough picture of 1845 Ireland and England (we will use the subscripts I
and E): We model them as symmetric economies with equal populations and an
identical allocation of individuals between industry and agriculture. One simple
justification for the assumption of symmetry is the fact that at our 1845 starting
point the population of Ireland was very close to the combined population of
England and Wales.8 Thus, our starting values are LI = LE = 0.15 and AI = AE =
0.35. In other words, the sum of all individuals is equal to 1 and 70 per cent of
the population is employed in rural areas.
We set our starting parameter values to be consistent with regional
convergence: In the terminology used above, we set t, s and m so that an increase
in f has a negative effect on 
  
w1
w2 . To ensure this we choose relatively extreme
parameter values, setting t = 0.15 (very high transportation costs) and m = 0.3
(only 30 per cent of income is spent on industrial goods). We set s = 7 and
g = 0.325. Thus, given the parameter values chosen, the symmetric outcome is a
dynamically stable equilibrium.
Now, we add two new elements to the model. First, instead of fixing the number
of peasants as constant, we allow for Irish rural depopulation. As we outlined
above, the Famine led directly to a large decline in rural population and the
effect of potato blight ensured a continuing decline in agricultural employment
during the post-Famine period. Thus, we assume a substantial exogenous decline
in the number of Irish agricultural workers. Figure 3 shows the simulated decline
(with the number of agricultural workers indexed to its 1845 level). Rather
than be precise about the exact pattern of this decline, we simulated a gradual
decline from 1845 to 1890, the magnitude of which closely matches that observed
during this period. We assume that, of the individuals leaving rural Ireland, a
fraction r (which we set equal to 0.75) emigrate to the US while the rest move
into Irish industry.
Second, we explicitly model the dynamic process driving emigration of
industrial workers from Ireland to England using the following simple equation:
   M =g(wE -wI)LI (18)
This equation states that the proportion of industrial workers emigrating from
Ireland to England is a function of the difference between English and Irish
wage rates. Thus, letting AI be the number of people in rural Ireland, the change
in industrial employment in Ireland can be modelled as
   DLIt =- (1-r)DAIt -g(wE -wI)LIt (19)
8. Source: Mitchell (1980). Note, however, that exact symmetry is not crucial to our simulations.ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 13
Figure 3: Agricultural Employment (Base Simulation)
The results of this “base” simulation can be seen in Figures 4, 5 and 6. These
show industrial employment, population, and real wages, respectively, for both
Ireland and England. Since we assume that a quarter of those leaving Irish
agriculture go into Irish industry, the direct impact of rural depopulation is to
increase industrial employment. However, the wage effects work in the opposite
direction. A decrease in the number of agricultural workers leads to a lower
wage through the home market effect. Thus, we observe a decline in real wages
in both Ireland and England with the decline in Ireland being larger because
the lost customers were relatively more important for Irish firms. The effects on
emigration of higher wages in England quickly overrides the positive impact of
rural depopulation on Irish industrial employment. The period of falling
industrial employment in Ireland eventually comes to an end, however, because
we have set parameter values so that, given stable values of agricultural
employment, the convergence force eventually takes over again.
The final outcome of this simulation shows falling numbers of agricultural
and industrial workers for over 45 years after the Famine with significant
emigration to both the US and England. Because real wages fall slower in
England than they do in Ireland, the majority of displaced agricultural workers
who do not emigrate directly to the US eventually end up, along with large
numbers of industrial workers, emigrating to England. The moral of this story14 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Figure 4: Industrial Employment (Base Simulation)
Figure 5: Population (Base Simulation)ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 15
Figure 6: Real Wages (Base Simulation)
is as follows. Even with parameter values set to be consistent with a convergent
equilibrium, the logic of firm-level increasing returns implies that the fall in
the number of agricultural workers induced by the Famine through its different
channels (direct effects during 1845-55, effect of potato blight on the demand
for agricultural workers, and facilitation of further emigration to the US) would
have implied a very large fall in population. We have modelled a large part of
this population decline — emigration to the US — as exogenous, but the results
would be similar if we had specified an endogenous rule for US emigration. The
initial decline in population triggered by the death of one million people and the
emigration of one million more, implied a large fall in the size of the local Irish
market for industrial goods. This reduced the profitability of local firms and
thus wage rates, triggering a process of declining industrial employment. Thus,
Irish wages never rose enough to reduce emigration during the post-Famine
period.
While the simulation illustrated in Figures 4, 5 and 6 may capture some of
the important features of post-Famine Ireland (declining industrial employment,
emigration driven by higher wages abroad) there is one feature that does not fit
the facts. While the reduction in Irish rural population may indeed have
restrained industrial wages in both Ireland and England, we know that real
wages in both countries were in fact rising with the rate of increase being slower
in Ireland. However, the model can be adapted to allow for two developments16 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
that helped increase real industrial wages during the post-Famine period:
• Transportation Costs: Throughout the post-Famine period the railway and
canal systems of Ireland and Britain were substantially developed, making
it far easier to transport industrial goods in both directions. In terms of
our model, this implied a large increase in t. To model this, we allowed for
a gradual increase in t from 0.15 to 0.75 over the same period as the decline
in agricultural employment, 1845-90.
• Increased Demand for Manufacturing Goods: Our assumption that
individuals spend only 30 per cent of their incomes on manufacturing goods
is also unlikely to fit the facts of this period. While we do not have any
exact data on this variable, it seems likely that this period of rising
prosperity saw an increase in the proportion of income spent on manufactur-
ing goods. This can be modelled from microfoundations by altering
preferences to take the Stone-Geary form with individuals having utility
function    U = CM
m (CA -S)
1-m where S is a subsistence level of consumption
of food. For simplicity, however, we will just model this process through a
gradual rise in m from 0.3 to 0.6 over the period 1845-90.
Figures 7 through 10 illustrate the result of this “full” simulation adding
these changes in exogenous parameter values to move towards a more realistic
model for the period.9 These changes have an important effect on the results of
the simulations. The shift towards higher t and m implies rising real wages in
both Ireland and England during the post-Famine period with English wages
rising by more. However, it also implies that by the time the decline in agri-
cultural employment triggered by the Famine is over (1890 in our simulations),
parameter values are now consistent with a divergent equilibrium. Thus,
industrial employment and population keep falling after 1890 and beyond. The
final figures for cumulative emigration from Ireland, shown in Figure 10, are
very close to the actual figures.10
While the outcome of the process described in this simulation — Ireland ends
up with almost no industry — is clearly extreme, it actually fits the picture of
Free State Ireland circa independence (1921) relatively well. By the early 1920s
Irish industry was very heavily concentrated around Belfast, located in eastern
Ulster, the area which suffered least during the Famine.11 Furthermore, the
post-independence performance of the Irish economy was one of relative economic
decline.
  9. There is also one other difference. We reduce the parameter g which describes the sensitivity
of emigration to Irish-English wage differentials because if it is kept at its previous level industrial
employment goes to zero too quickly.
10. The balance between US and UK emigration shown in Figure 10 could also have been altered
to fit the data if we allowed for emigration of industrial workers to the US.
11. See Ó Gráda (1989) for a discussion of the regional dimensions of the Famine.ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 17
Figure 7: Industrial Employment (Full Simulation)
Figure 8: Population (Full Simulation)18 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Figure 9: Real Wages (Full Simulation)
Figure 10: Cumulative Emigration (Full Simulation)ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 19
V  CONCLUSION
This paper has adapted the model of Krugman (1991) and used it to explain
how the Great Irish Famine of 1845-55 may have had more far-reaching effects
on subsequent Irish economic development than most economic historians have
believed. In particular, it provides a warning against “compartmentalising” Irish
economic history and viewing the process of rural depopulation, emigration,
and industrial failure as separate issues requiring separate explanations. This
is what many Irish economic historians have done: rural depopulation is
explained by exogenous price shocks (Crotty), emigration by external economic
change (Guinnane), and industrial failure by a range of theories such as those
appealing to external economies of scale. If Irish people emigrated because of
higher wages elsewhere, to explain Irish emigration as a result of external
economic change is to look at only one side of the coin. An explanation for the
failure of Irish industry to grow is also required.
The argument in this paper is that the rural depopulation triggered by the
Famine decreased the profitability and wage levels of Irish industry. This led to
more emigration and, by the time the rural depopulation had ceased, exogenous
changes to transportation costs and the demand for industrial goods ensured
continued industrial backwardness. While the model is clearly stylised, it fits
some of the key important facts of the period and, perhaps, may prove useful in
analysing other aspects of post-Famine Irish economic history.
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